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Jonathan Wolff 
 
Abstract: What contribution can political philosophers make to policy questions, 
such as the best configuration of the welfare state? On one view, political 
philosophers set out abstract theories of justice that can guide policy makers in 
their attempt to transform existing institutions. Yet it rarely seems the case that 
such a model is used in practice, and it therefore becomes unclear how political 
philosophy can contribute to policy debates. Following a suggestion from 
Margaret MacDonald, I consider the view that political philosophers can 
contribute by drawing attention to relatively neglected values. I develop this 
view to add the possibility that political philosophers can try to correct a 
situation in which a particular value, though important, can come to be too 
highly emphasized. I illustrate the account by considering the rise of the value of 
‘responsibility’ in the welfare state, and ultimately the damage that has been 
done to society to disadvantaged groups by the over-insistence on the 
importance of responsibility. 
 
 
1. Methodology in Political Philosophy Today 
 
 
Can abstract reasoning in political philosophy have an influence on public policy? 
One model of how this can happen is that, on the basis of sustained philosophical 
reflection and argument, using all the tools on the philosophical workbench, 
philosophers develop theories of justice. These theories are then taken up by 
politicians and policy makers and applied to real situations, leading to 
philosophically informed policy. On this view a model is provided of a perfectly 
just world – as if the political philosopher is the legislator for an ideal kingdom of 
the imagination – and the real world is to be changed so as to conform with the 
theory. Now, it will be conceded that matters of practicality make it unlikely that 
the theory will be applied in anything approaching pure form. Yet it is not 
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unreasonable to think that empirical reality can be brought more in the direction 
of some theoretical ideal than it has been in the past. For example, it is commonly 
believed that Lockean ideas influenced the American revolution, egalitarian 
ideas the development of the welfare state, and Nozickian libertarianism may 
have influenced the direction taken in Thatcherite social policy; a topic we will 
return to below. In more recent decades we have seen a flirtation with 
communitarian ideas, although it is harder to see any connection with policy 
changes. 
According to this way of connecting theory and policy, a philosophical 
theory of justice is articulated into some sort of model of an ideally just society, 
which is then used as a type of blueprint or architect’s model of a society. 
However, given that, socially, we are never building an entirely new building, 
compromise is needed. We have to adjust what we have, and thereby try to make 
it resemble the blueprint as much as we can, rather attempt to realise the 
blueprint in full detail. 
There is, I think, something correct in this suggestion about how political 
philosophy can have an influence on actual policy, although we will need to 
modify the account in significant ways. To come to a more descriptively accurate 
view it will, first of all, be useful to confront some apparent difficulties with what 
we can call the ‘blueprint’ model. And indeed the analogy with architecture 
immediately suggests some oddities. Does any architect ever propose 
modifications to a building by drawing up plans for an ideal building, paying no 
attention to the existing building, and then see how much of the ideal building 
can be established by modifying the existing one? Perhaps some highly 
demanding clients have instructed their architects to build in this fashion, but it 
is easy to see its difficulties, and the tensions – in the architectural case, literally 
so – that will arise. 
The architect, making modifications, should not, then, start by trying to 
imagine the best building possible, but, perhaps, the best possible building 
(subject to planning, financial and other constraints such as the client’s own 
ideas) given what already exists. And in parallel it has been suggested by 
Bernard Williams that our task as political philosophers is not to try to envisage 
the best society possible: rather it is to try to work out what we can achieve 
 3 
starting from what is at hand.1 By contrast, starting by trying to imagine the 
ideally best possible society, and then trying to change society so that it 
resembles it to the greatest extent, runs the danger of producing something far 
worse than if we gone about the task in much more pragmatic fashion.2 This is 
simply one version of the ‘theory of the second best’. 
In recent work Sen has developed such a position in more detail. One 
possible way of setting out the type of contextual position mentioned by 
Williams would suggest that we should look for the best we can achieve starting 
from here. Sen, I believe, would question whether it is necessary or even helpful 
to look for the ‘best’ even when the best is constrained by ‘starting from here’.3 
Instead of the best, we should look for what we might call the manifestly and 
uncontroversially better. Again, the architectural metaphor may help. In 
improving a building, how much place is there for reflection on the idea of the 
‘best’ building we could create starting from here? Isn’t the right thing to do to 
consider ways in which it can be made better, rather than start with an idea of 
what would be the very best? 
Now this may seem defeatist, but one reason for arguing that considering 
the best will be unhelpful is that the notion of ‘the best’ will be highly contested. 
In the architectural case, the architect, the client, and the town planner may all 
have quite different ideas. What, then, is ‘the best’? How can we know? Turning 
back to political philosophy, this is, perhaps, the most obvious difficulty with the 
blueprint model, and a charge Engels, for example, memorably made against the 
utopian socialists. Each utopian had his own blueprint, his own model of the 
ideal society, and each, supposes Engels, believed his model reflected the eternal 
truth about justice. But all the models were different. Which, if any, really 
captured the nature of justice?4 How could you tell? How could you convince 
others? And as Alasdair MacIntrye has remarked, if you do not have arguments 
that would convince others, how is it that you came to be convinced yourself?5  
We have seen, then, two reasons for questioning the blueprint model. 
First, in politics we are always in the business of making changes, not starting 
afresh. Trying to change the world so that it maximally conforms with an ideal 
can lead to serious problems if the ideal is not achievable. Second, all ideals are 
contested, and there is no standard of argument or proof where one can be 
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established over others to the satisfaction of all. 
In response it might well be asked whether any beneficial change will be 
possible unless we accept that some ideals are better than others. If ideals are 
contested how can we tell that a change is even for the better? If we do not have 
an idea of what would be best, how can we know what would be better?  
But, it seems, there can be agreement that something is better even 
without agreement on what is best. Consider two famous examples from 
Amartya Sen himself: famines and missing women. Regarding famines, Sen 
argued that famines are not principally caused by lack of food, but rather lack of 
entitlement to food. And in a well-functioning democracy with a free press 
famines do not happen, as it is not actually difficult to feed a population if there is 
the will to do it. As allowing the people to starve is not a way of getting re-
elected, the combination of publicity and democracy will ensure that there is 
protection against famine, at least in normal circumstances.6 Consequently 
famines are political failures, not highly unfortunate, but ultimately random 
events. 
Regarding missing women, Sen reports that there are far fewer women 
alive in the world – many millions fewer – than biology alone would predict, 
suggesting that neglect has led to poorer survival rates for young girls than for 
their brothers.7 Both of these facts about the world are likely to give rise to a 
widespread belief that current political and social practices in these respects are 
unjustified and that changes are called for. It is not difficult to think of ways of 
changing things for the better. But we can do this without having a blueprint of a 
‘best’ society in our heads.8 
These examples of ‘manifest injustice’ are striking. However, in the 
practical politics of a modern liberal democratic society many of our disputes are 
of a less dramatic nature. Sen draws our attention to phenomena that previously 
were neglected, but once named and shamed will roundly be condemned. 
Probably there are still some issues that afflict current liberal democracies and 
will shock us when we come to reflect on them. For example, the relatively 
recent criminalization of marital rape shows that countries can let a serious 
injustice go unrecognized even in broadly enlightened times. However, the 
disputes of contemporary politics are just that: disputes, with many sides to 
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them, and weighty voices on more than one side. 
In the face of such disagreement Sen seems to recommend democratic 
procedures. In practical terms this is reasonable enough, but for those who had 
the hope that philosophical theory can resolve contentious issues it is a 
disappointing result. On this account philosophical thinking appears to have a 
role only where it isn’t needed: where there is sufficient consensus on a policy 
that no arguments are required. But on reflection, was philosophical even 
needed to identify manifest injustice? Note that Sen’s contribution in these cases 
was largely empirical. It was Sen the social scientist, not Sen the philosopher, 
who brought our attention to famine and missing women. 
The problem, then, can be put like this. Political philosophy has to be focused 
on a particular concrete situation or problem if it is to make a genuine 
contribution to practical affairs. In some cases, where the problem or injustice is 
very clear once described, there appears to be nothing more for political 
philosophy to do once the problem is identified. It is a matter of bringing to 
attention something that earlier we had failed to notice and social science may 
be better for this than philosophy. If, on the other hand, the issue is contested 
then it appears that political philosophy seems desperately needed, but it is hard 
to see how it can settle any issues. There is no methodology for recognizing the 
force of the better argument. This does not mean that ideal theory is empty or 
useless. But it does raise a question of how political philosophy can influence real 
politics. 
 
2. Methodology in Political Philosophy in the 1940s and 1950s 
 
 
I would like to try to make some headway on this issue by going back about sixty 
years, to another time when political philosophy was especially methodologically 
self-conscious, but even more dispirited: to the famous preface to Laslett’s edited 
collection Philosophy, Politics and Society.9 Laslett remarkably, in the editor’s 
introduction to a collection of then new and recent writing in political 
philosophy, manages the reader’s expectations dramatically downwards by 
declaring: ‘For the moment, anyway, political philosophy is dead’.10 
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Laslett considers three factors that have led to this unhappy situation. 
One is the rise of logical positivism. Another is the growing influence of sociology 
in which political ideas, and their rise and fall, are to be considered as objects of 
social analysis rather than possible bearers of truth or even independent 
significance. But also Laslett suggests that the horrors of the second world war 
exerted powerful influence:  ‘Faced with Hiroshima and with Belsen, a man is 
unlikely to address himself to a neat and original theory of political obligation.’11 
While one can sympathise with Laslett’s point, early in the second world 
war, admittedly prior to Hiroshima and Belsen, an insightful paper appeared in 
which a woman, not a man, did indeed attend to the problem of political 
obligation: Margaret MacDonald’s ‘The Language of Political Theory’.12 
MacDonald’s immediate concern is the inadequacy of a crude positivistic 
approach to political philosophy that in certain circles was becoming the 
fashionable ‘state of the art’.13 She points out that, contrary to the standard 
positivist position, political disagreement does not always seem to be based on 
disputed empirical issues or linguistic confusion, and remaining political 
disagreements can have enormous impact on human lives. Hence the positivist 
criterion of significance is not adequate to political philosophy. By way of case 
study, she turns her attention to the problem of political obligation, arguing that 
none of the leading accounts – social contract, tradition, utilitarian – provide a 
general answer, and that instead each holds part of the truth. According to 
MacDonald there is an indefinite set of vaguely shifting criteria, differing for 
different times and circumstances. Consequently: 
 
The value of the political theorists, however, is not in the general 
information they give about the basis of political obligation but in their skill 
in emphasizing at a critical moment a criterion which is tending to be 
overlooked or denied.14  
 
I find this an exceptionally useful insight. Note, though, that the political 
theorists may not conceive of themselves as engaged in this task. They are more 
likely to believe that they have come to understand the single, previously 
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overlooked, truth about a topic and that their view – perhaps even their ideal 
theory or blueprint for society – should replace all previous false accounts. It 
may be that at the highest level political philosophy can only succeed if it has an 
overwhelming ambition and false self-conception. Yet its role in practice, at best, 
will be to modify existing practice rather than replace one set of practices with 
an entirely different alternative. In relatively recent decades, for example, to 
remain within the topic of political obligation, the rise of philosophical 
anarchism, especially through the work of Robert Paul Wolff15 and A. John 
Simmons,16 has led not to the abandonment of government, but the assertion of 
individual autonomy in the face of growing centralization of power. In response, 
proponents of the ‘principle of fairness’, such as George Klosko,17 remind us of 
the benefits of stable government. 
We can illustrate MacDonald’s claims further by means of a debate that 
occurred in relation to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
immediately after the Second World War. During the drafting process some of 
the contributors became uncomfortable that the document seemed very one-
sided: all the obligations seemed to be piled on the state and all the rights on the 
individual. The Soviet Union is said to have found the absence of a ‘declaration of 
human duties’ especially troubling.18 In a sense, one could say, the criticism is 
that the Universal Declaration failed to include an account of political obligation. 
In answer to this objection Charles Malik, from the Lebanon (a philosopher who 
studied under both Whitehead at Harvard and Heidegger at Freiburg), argued: 
 
The problem of human rights arose in recent years precisely because 
society and the state trespassed upon man, to the extent, in totalitarian 
states, of choking him altogether. In our formulation we are therefore 
called upon to correct the excesses precisely of statism and socialism. The 
right amount of anarchism and individualism is exactly what statism and 
socialism need. It is not that we find ourselves at present in a lawless 
jungle with every man brutally seeking his own individual advantage 
without any organized lines of relation and authority; and as a result we 
are called upon, so to speak, to restore order and authority by reminding 
men of their duties and obligations: It is rather that we find ourselves 
 8 
today in a situation, all the world over, in which man's simple, essential 
humanity—his power to laugh and love and think and change his mind, in 
freedom—is in mortal danger of extinction by reason of endless pressures 
from every side.19 
 
Malik’s point, then, was not that individuals do not have duties to the 
state, but that now – 1948 – is not the time to emphasize this thought. Rather, 
some states have shown astonishing disregard for the rights and freedoms of 
individuals, including those of their own citizens, and it is necessary to grasp the 
opportunity to rebalance the relation in favour of the individual. Implicitly, he 
suggests, there may be other times when it is important to assert the duties of 
the individual to the state. 
To retrace our steps, I do not think it is being suggested today that 
political philosophy is dead. We are not worried by logical positivism. Sociology 
does not have the undermining power it was once thought to have. True, wars 
are still being fought, but not on the scale of the Second World War. What, then, 
is our concern? Primarily, I think, it is a version of what Rawls calls the ‘burdens 
of judgement’.20 By this I understand the idea that in relation to political ideas 
the ‘free use of reason’ will lead different people in different directions and to 
different conclusions, and there is no standard of proof to which they can be 
held. This is not to endorse the positivist view that strictly speaking any such 
statements are meaningless. It is not a semantic thesis. Neither is it to suggest 
that there are no standards of rigour. Some arguments are fallacious, or very 
poorly supported by evidence. Nevertheless, processes of reasoning will rarely 
leave us with just one conclusion. Our problem, therefore, is that there are too 
many apparently sound answers to many questions in political philosophy. 
Philosophical reasoning may settle issues in the head of those propounding 
particular arguments, but reasoning on its own generally lacks the power to shift 
others who have deeply held political views, whether or not backed by 
arguments of their own. This, of course, is the observation made by MacIntrye 
referred to above. 
Sometimes this point is put in terms of irreconcilable value conflict. But 
that seems to me not exactly to express our problem. It is rarely accurate to say 
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that political disagreement is a consequence of people holding different values. 
By and large, I think, we all hold pretty much the same values. Who is against 
liberty? Or, suitably understood, equality? Or relief of extreme need? Where we 
differ, typically, is how to weigh them when they come into conflict.21 
Yet we are not paralysed. At any time a set of political institutions and 
practices is in place, informed, by design or accident, by a set of values or other 
factors. There is, we might say, a set of status quo policies and a set of status quo 
values, which, in stable times, support those policies. At other times, however, 
there will objections to the policies and a social critic will either attempt to 
demonstrate that the policies are out of kilter with society’s values, or argue that 
we need to shift our values in such a way that they will no longer support the 
policies. In some cases the criticism will be very radical, calling for what may 
seem to be a total redirection of policy and approach. On MacDonald’s analysis, 
however, a social commentator – who may or may not have a professional status 
as a political philosopher – is likely to have misunderstood his or her own 
contribution to the debate. A trenchant critique will be possible because, socially, 
it can be argued that what now may seem to be undue, or too little, weight is 
given to one factor, perhaps as a result of an earlier attempt to make a 
correction. This, I think, is where Margaret MacDonald’s observation is so 
helpful. It could be, for example, that while 1948 was the time to emphasize the 
rights of individuals against the state, it is not impossible that by some later 
period the situation will need to be rebalanced; a debate that is regularly 
revived, especially in the light of perceived terrorist threat. 
Certainly I do not want to argue that all political philosophy falls into the 
pattern that MacDonald has offered, or that this is the only way in which political 
philosophy can influence policy. But I do think MacDonald has identified 
something very important, although we need to realize that what she says really 
point to major movements in political philosophy rather than the day to day 
contributions of most political philosophers. The type of change in emphasis of 
values that MacDonald points to is something akin to a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’, 
when a new way of looking at a problem takes hold, rather than normal science, 
where the details of a new view, and problems with it, are sifted over with a fine 
toothcomb,22 although unlike Kuhn in this case it is better to regard the contrast 
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as representing two ends of a continuum rather than a stark distinction. Within 
the problem of political obligation, for example, we can see the rise of the theory 
of the social contract, with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, its decline with 
Bentham and Mill, and its revival in modified form with Rawls, as examples of 
ways in which values were emphasized, minimized and then re-affirmed. Few 
political philosophers can make a contribution of such significance, but many 
will contribute to the refinement and advocacy of values.  
 
3. Political Philosophy and the Welfare State 
 
How, though, do these methodological reflections bear on our present topic, the 
welfare state? It is worth, once more, returning to British political theory of the 
1950s, at a time when the welfare state in the UK, in its post-war Beveridge fully-
fledged form, was not yet even a decade old: to Anthony Crosland, former Oxford 
Economics don, who had in 1955 lost his seat as a Labour MP, and thus had the 
leisure to finish writing his 1956 book The Future of Socialism.23 
Reading the early chapters of The Future of Socialism one is struck by the 
confidence – perhaps even the heartbreaking complacency – with which 
Crosland reports upon a political consensus. National real incomes are rising.24 
Full employment has been achieved,25 and partly as a result, the capitalist class 
has lost its power, for the workers have no fear of long-term unemployment.26 
Laissez-faire is dead and buried.27 The mixed economy in which, according to 
Crosland, 25% of workers are employed by the state and in which over 50% of 
investment is made, is regarded as here to stay. 28 No conservative government, 
it was suggested, would be able to undo more than a small portion of post-war 
reforms.29 ‘The national shift to the Left, with all its implications for the balance 
of power, may be accepted as permanent.’30 The NHS – a mere eight years old – is 
already regarded as a fixture; severe poverty apparently eradicated; full 
employment achieved; and income inequality within reasonable bounds. Keynes 
did indeed, it seems, have all the answers. 
Still, not all is right with Crosland’s Britain; with disapproval and regret 
he notes that it has a rigid class structure, which even rising incomes for the 
lower classes has not eroded. Class is no longer correlated with income: highly 
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skilled workers may earn more than many of their middle class neighbours, but 
nevertheless they are divided by habits, accents, manners, and worst of all, 
attitudes to each other.31 Socialism still has work to do: ‘We have plenty of less 
fortunate citizens still requiring aid; and we certainly have not got an equal or 
classless society, nor one characterized by “co-operative’ social relations.”’32 
Yet at the same time counter-currents were swelling. In the United States 
Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, published in 1962, but based on 
lectures first given in 1956, the year of The Future of Socialism, would restate the 
case for laissez-faire that Crosland had declared extinct.33 No doubt Crosland 
would have regarded such ideas as eccentric or irrelevant in the UK at the time, 
perhaps even anachronistic, writing: 
 
Capitalism was historically associated with an explicit, assertive, and in 
the perspective of history, unusual ideology. Its essential features were, 
first, the veneration of individualism and competition: secondly, an 
insistence on the absolute and unconditional rights of private property: 
thirdly, an intellectual belief that the unfettered exercise of private rights 
must, by ‘the invisible hand’ of economic competition, maximize the 
welfare of the community. 
 
None of these beliefs could be said to form part of the ruling ideology in 
Britain today. The non-capitalist classes have always opposed an ideal of 
co-operation, social action, and collective responsibility to that of 
individualism; and as their power grew, so this idea increasingly 
prevailed. No one would argue that in the contemporary Welfare State the 
dominant ideology was one of self-help or aggressive individualism. And 
even within the business class itself, as Chapter 1 has shown, the worship 
of individualism has given way to a positive cult of team-work and group 
action.34  
 
Crosland’s world is one in which particular values are paramount: perhaps best 
described as fairness tempered by compassion and solidarity. Fairness means 
that traditional privilege is to replaced by opportunities for all. Compassion 
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requires concern for the needs and interests of all; especially those who would 
suffer in a ruthless laissez-faire economy. Solidarity generates a sense, not only 
of ‘team-work and group action’, but that the poor should not be made to grovel. 
Assistance should not be regarded as a matter of Christian charity. All have 
rights, and should be granted the necessary entitlements and protections to have 
access to the means of well-being without having to rely on the arbitrary 
goodwill of others. Indeed such a view may well underlie Rawls’s A Theory of 
Justice,35 which is why Stuart Hampshire in his 1972 review, was able to praise it 
in the following terms: 
 
[A] noble, coherent, highly abstract picture of the fair society, as social 
democrats see it. In England, books about the Labour Party’s aims … needed 
just such a theory of justice as this, stated in its full philosophical generality. 
This is certainly the model of social justice that has governed the advocacy of 
R. H. Tawney and Richard Titmuss and that holds the Labour Party together. 
Society must repair the cruelties of nature, and it exists not only to preserve 
law and order but also to correct the natural differentials between the 
strong and the weak, and to give institutional support to self-respect, which 
is for Rawls a primary value.36 
 
Contrast Crosland, and Hampshire’s account of Rawls, however, with concern for 
the poor as it appears in Friedman: 
 
[The classical liberal] will regard private charity directed at helping the 
less fortunate as an example of the proper use of freedom. And he may 
approve state action designed at ameliorating poverty as a more effective 
way in which the great bulk of the community can achieve a common 
objective. He will do so with regret, however, for having to substitute 
compulsory for voluntary action.37  
 
Like it or not, Friedman’s position fits beautifully into Margaret MacDonald’s 
account of the value of political theories: ‘emphasising at a crucial moment a 
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criteria which is tending to be overlooked or denied’. On reading Friedman, and, 
ten years later, Robert Nozick,38 and then later still, Friedman’s re-stating of his 
position in his co-authored volume (with his wife Rose Friedman) Free to 
Choose,39 one is struck that a key value appears to be missing from the picture 
provided by Crosland: individual responsibility, or as Crosland puts it ‘self-help’. 
Indeed the importance for Friedman of the notion of responsibility is brought 
out in the first paragraph of Capitalism And Freedom, in criticism of J.F. 
Kennedy’s famous remark ‘Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what 
you can do for your country.’ In response, neither possibility, says Friedman, 
represents an attractive vision. The first ignores the free man’s ‘belief in his own 
responsibility for his own destiny’.40 And the second assumes a view of 
government in which it has ends of its own and threatens to become a 
‘Frankenstein’.41 
Friedman and Nozick point out that the anti-laissez-faire world, providing 
entitlements to the means to well-being for the marginalized, underplays the fact 
that those means only exist as a result of other people’s efforts.42 All would be 
acceptable, on Friedman’s view at least, if the only people who received benefits 
were genuinely unable to help themselves. However, once the system exists, it 
places power in the hands of people who may use it, unfairly, to their own 
advantage, according to the critics on the welfare state. By contrast, the value of 
responsibility suggests that those who have chosen a pattern of life that leaves 
them without the means to well-being – the welfare scroungers or undeserving 
poor – have no rightful claim. Self-help is our right and duty, and Friedman 
quotes Dicey regretting the decline in ‘faith in self-help’.43 Alongside this 
complaint is another: that some of the gainfully employed have become too 
powerful, especially through the collective bargaining of the trade unions, and 
are demanding and receiving more than their contribution warrants. Crosland 
himself points to the power of the trade unions; ‘even under the Conservative 
Government the Trade Unions remain effective masters of the industrial scene’.44 
(For Friedman this situation is not acceptable,45 though of course it would be no 
better for him if the government controlled industry. 
On its own, the advocacy of self-help may seem at best rather quaint or 
dated as an idea. Indeed, suggesting that those in a difficult situation should, in 
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the first instance, look to their own resources can appear mean-spirited or 
narrow-minded. But when added to a growing sense of urgent economic crisis – 
no or low growth, runaway inflation, declining tax revenues, rising 
unemployment, falling balance of payments, and so on – economies need to be 
made, and those who defend generous or undifferentiated welfare benefits may 
be wrong-footed. We retain a duty to help those who genuinely are unable to 
look after themselves, almost all will agree. But, according to the value of 
responsibility, when times are hard we need to take a careful look to ensure that 
we are not also helping those who, in fact, are perfectly capable of taking care of 
themselves. And, to revert to a theme from Crosland, when unemployment rises, 
economic power shifts from the worker to employers, who are then in a better 
position to influence the future direction of society. Indeed the rise of the 
Friedmanite view may be evidence that Crosland’s claimed consensus was a thin 
veneer achieved by the political classes, while underneath ordinary belief and 
discourse had never fully abandoned ideas of ‘self-help’ and individual 
responsibility. 
When it is perceived that society faces economic pressures, a tension 
between solidarity and responsibility becomes acute. Compassion, most agree, 
requires helping those who cannot look after themselves. Responsibility 
requires, or at least permits, not assisting those who can take care of themselves. 
But solidarity, so it appears, requires institutions that make it very hard to 
distinguish between those who can, and those who cannot, help themselves.46 
The rise of responsibility has been accompanied by the fading away of solidarity: 
those who claim welfare benefits are seen not so much as fellow citizens who 
also have rights to a common pot, but as a mixture of the helpless and of possible 
fraudsters, who need to be checked carefully to ensure that they are not cheating 
or gaming the system. 
One consequence of such attitudes to claimants, accompanied often by 
low rates of welfare benefits, it that the prophecy has, to a degree, become self-
fulfilling. Within the system of welfare benefits in the UK, there is, I would argue 
a hidden manifest injustice. It may not be on the scale of Sen’s missing women, or 
famine victims, or have the shock value of marital rape, but nevertheless it 
affects perhaps hundreds of thousands of people in the UK. In the attempt to 
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ensure that only those in genuine need receive help, two measures have been 
adopted. One is to ensure that welfare benefits are as low as feasibly they can be, 
so as not to give those capable of work an incentive to avoid it. The other is to 
have rigorous programmes of enforcement against those who attempt, illegally, 
to supplement their welfare benefits through working. As a result we have 
brought into existence a large group of people commonly referred to as ‘benefit 
cheats’.  
Now I have no doubt that there are some people engaged in fraud in a 
systematic and clearly criminal fashion. But I am more interested in people who 
are unable to find a job with decent pay and conditions, and so, reluctantly, claim 
state benefits. Yet these benefits are sufficient only for a basic level of existence. 
If you have a family, can you afford to buy birthday presents? Can you afford a 
night out now and again? Can you afford the fare to visit friends and family? A 
report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found that, according to their survey, 
one of the greatest necessities of life was ‘being able to visit friends and family in 
hospital’ (behind ‘beds and bedding for everyone’, ‘heating to warm living areas 
of the home’ and ‘damp-free home’, but above ‘medicines prescribed by a doctor’ 
and ‘two meals a day’).47 This – alongside the other things mentioned – can be 
very difficult for people on benefits given the cost of even public transport.  
Simply in order to provide themselves with the necessities of life many 
people on benefits engage in minor acts of criminality. Some work a few hours a 
week for cash, often in domestic cleaning. Some purchase goods they strongly 
suspect to be stolen. Some drive without tax or insurance. These are ‘victimless 
crimes’ at least at the first remove. And they are undertaken not out of a 
‘criminal mentality’ or greed, but simply to be able afford the things that other 
people take for granted. But the fact that people are acting outside the law makes 
these people vulnerable to arrest, prosecution, public humiliation, fines or even a 
prison sentence. And, of course, this is a group that cannot complain about their 
situation without thereby admitting to criminal actions that could see them 
jailed, and thus the group is silenced.  The situation of such people is troubling in 
itself, but also likely to lead to chronic stress, which in turn is very likely to lead 
to health problems. On my account these people suffer from severe 
disadvantage, which I understand as being in a situation of significant 
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disadvantage where the available strategies for improving your situation put you 
at significant risk of making yourself much worse off (in this case, a court 
appearance, prison or fines, and public disgrace).48 
I would contend that this is a situation of manifest injustice. True it is not 
as striking as Sen’s  examples of famines or missing women, but then examples of 
injustice in the developed world are likely to be less striking than those on a 
global scale. Nevertheless I think it is hard for anyone to consider the case just 
made and conclude it is perfectly reasonable that those who cannot find a job 
must live at an intolerable level of poverty if they wish to remain within the 
confines of the law. I can imagine someone trying to argue that I have the 
proportions wrong, and most benefit cheats are not as I have described. Or 
someone arguing that any attempt to reform the situation will make things 
worse in some way. But I find it hard to think of people who could accept the 
description and think there is not even reason to consider reform of the welfare 
stat. A reform that, perhaps paradoxically, out of solidarity would make some 
form of self-help more available to claimants. 
My suggestion, then, is that the values upon which the welfare state was 
founded included compassion and solidarity (no doubt there were other values, 
and indeed considerations of efficiency, as can be found as the basis for 
Beveridge’s arguments for a tax funded health system49). Arguably this 
combination of values paid insufficient attention to the idea of individual 
responsibility in both its positive form – goods come into the world through the 
efforts of individuals – and its negative form – those who are capable of looking 
after themselves but fail to do so have no claim on others. Once raised and 
defended with vigour, these considerations concerning responsibility, which 
were always present in some form, became prominent once again in public ideas 
and debates, and then, when combined with a sense of economic crisis were able 
to come to the fore, via the theories of Friedman and to a lesser extent Nozick, 
and exemplified in the deliberate rolling back of the welfare state in the policies 
of Thatcher and Reagan.  
On both the philosophical and public front, the notion of responsibility 
has not received the level of challenge it might have done. As is well documented 
contemporary egalitarian thought has attempted to recapture the notion of 
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responsibility within an egalitarian picture;50 and in the UK thirteen years of 
Labour government did little to throttle back on the notion of responsibility. As a 
result the position of the least advantaged, those very people that the system is 
designed to help, have increasingly been under attack, with declining benefits, 
and greater scrutiny in terms of whether they genuinely meet the full conditions 
for support. 
How, then, could the tide be turned? It would not, I think, be attractive or 
politically wise to try to deny that people should be responsible for their own 
fate where they can be. Rather, the programme to follow would be to emphasise 
once again the values of fairness, compassion and solidarity, and, as I have 
suggested elsewhere, let a doctrine of responsibility find its way in the space left 
by the more aggressive assertion of other values, rather than being treated as 
our pre-eminent value.51 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
My purpose, in this essay, has been fourfold. One is to understand one role that 
the political philosopher can play in contribution to policy debates. I have argued 
that however political philosophers conceive of their task, in effect the major 
contribution of the most significant figures in the discipline is, as Margaret 
MacDonald put it, to remind us of a consideration – an important value – that has 
been relatively neglected (or conversely given too much weight) in current 
arrangements. Second I have tried to illustrate MacDonald’s thesis by exploring 
the development of thinking about the welfare state, especially in the UK, by 
considering how the 1950’s consensus under-emphasised the value of 
responsibility (or self-help) which then received powerful defence by Friedman 
and Nozick. Such notions came to be more dominant than solidarity, which is 
now ‘relatively neglected’. Thirdly, I have argued that the emphasis on 
responsibility has done considerable damage to a large group of people who are 
now forced to break the law on a regular basis in order to live a minimally decent 
life. And so, finally, I suggest – no more than that – that now is the time to re-
emphasise the value of solidarity, and reduce the concern for individual 
responsibility. Somewhat paradoxically however, this may be best achieved by a 
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political philosopher who ignores the analysis of this paper, and has the self-
confidence to out forward an ideal blueprint of society in which the  idea of 
solidarity is the sole governing valaue.52 
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